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Abstract
This article examines the chief executive positions in the Victorian and Queensland local government systems
through Mintzberg’s three-dimensional model and Broussine’s capacity model, highlighting the complexities
and diversities of these roles. The different approaches to reform taken by the state governments have
produced different relationships between chief executives and elected representatives. Of particular interest is
the impact of the contract and key performance indicators used by local governments and their ability to
facilitate or constrain chief executives in achieving their objectives. The findings suggest that a key challenge
for local governments is to establish contractual and performance systems that allow chief executives to
achieve their objectives, to deal more effectively with challenges facing communities and contribute to more
sustainable local governments.
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Introduction 
 
Very little has been written on the role of the Australian local government Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). The role has changed considerably over the past two 
decades largely as a result of the reforms introduced by state governments to their 
respective local government systems. These reforms have been in keeping with 
global trends to reduce costs, improve efficiency and productivity, and make the 
public sector more responsive to the community.  Local councils are required to 
be focused upon cost-effective service provision, corporate and operational 
planning linked to programme budgeting, optimum human and financial resource 
management and upon contract management.  These management functions 
require an empowered role of the CEO (Alam & Pacher, 2000, pp. 364-365). The 
establishment of CEO positions, along with other senior management 
appointments based upon fixed-term performance contracts with no guarantee or 
expectancy of renewal, has attempted to reduce the legalism and conservatism of 
the traditional town clerk and city engineer regime (Pullin & Haidar, 2003, p. 
286). CEOs now need to be far more active and dynamic than the traditional town 
clerks who were more focused on administration and routine matters, ensuring 
local administrative systems ran smoothly (Jones, 1989, pp. 80-81). 
 
The Victorian and Queensland local government systems make interesting 
comparisons in terms of the approaches used to introduce reforms aimed at 
delivering sustainable cost effective services1. Victoria was an early mover and 
probably has gone further than any other jurisdiction in applying highly 
prescriptive reforms to local government; in fact some have argued Victorian 
local government has been subjected to more change than any other Australian 
public sector (Kloot and Goodwin 1997).  On the other hand Queensland has been 
slower to reform, only recently embarking upon one of the most far-reaching and 
controversial programs of statutory and structural change to local government in 
Australian history (Dollery, Wallis and Crase, 2007, p. 361).  Nevertheless, in 
both jurisdictions these measures have increased the importance of the CEO's 
role:  There is now considerable emphasis on the skills and experiences of CEOs 
with a view to them applying a more business-like culture to the local government 
context.  As such, the roles of CEOs have become more ambiguous and complex, 
warranting further investigation to reveal potential weaknesses, contradictions and 
consequences.  
 
                                                 
1
 Both the Melbourne City Council and Brisbane City Council have unique political and 
administrative arrangements within their respective state systems.  The findings of this research do 
not apply to these examples.   
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 This paper argues that CEOs are required to operate across multiple dimensions 
simultaneously.  The local government reforms introduced in both Victoria and 
Queensland over the past two decades and the subsequent requirements placed on 
CEOs will be examined first to establish context.  The evidence presented 
highlights the considerable challenges of the CEO task and the potential political 
and administrative consequences for local government administration in these 
states. The paper then critically investigates the nature of contractual 
arrangements and performance indicators being used to establish conditions for 
effective performance by CEOs in both jurisdictions. This research is built on a 
phenomenology-based approach to qualitative analysis using in-depth interviews 
with key government actors in both jurisdictions. Primary and secondary 
resources such as relevant policy documents from government and non-
government agencies and the Australian and international academic literature 
have been consulted to support the arguments and conclusions.   
 
The paper is divided into five main parts: Parts two and three provide synoptic 
accounts of reform processes to Victorian and Queensland local government over 
the past two decades and their impact upon the role of the CEO in the comparative 
jurisdictions. Part four focuses on the CEO experience through a theoretical 
framework based on Mintzberg’s (1998) ‘three edges’ model combined with 
Broussine’s (2000) notion of ‘capacity’. Part five considers the relevance of 
contractual requirements and key performance indicators in the context of the 
reforms and the changed nature of CEO roles. 
 
 
Local Government Reforms 
 
The reform processes contributing to the current shape of Australian local 
government have been well documented (see, for example, Marshall, 1998; 
Aulich, 1999; Worthington and Dollery, 2002).  Reforms that have impacted on 
the role of CEOs are those that have transformed local councils into complex, 
multi-objective organisations (Gerritsen and Whyard, 1998; Worthington et al., 
2002).  Changes have included the expansion of local government powers to give 
councils greater flexibility to manage their own affairs, the introduction of new 
public management (NPM) elements including the application of corporate and 
operational planning, contract-based employment for senior managers, 
compulsory competitive tendering, the adjustment of territorial boundaries and the 
amalgamation of smaller local councils into larger and fewer entities.  As part of 
these reforms, local councils have been required to change the way they manage 
their operations (Dollery, et al., 2007, p. 361).  Local councils have adopted 
sophisticated management models with leadership and direction being sought 
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 from highly skilled CEOs holding broad corporate perspectives.  CEOs need to be 
assisted by senior management professionals whose skills span engineering, town 
planning, environmental health, leadership, community development, social work, 
human services management, accountancy, law, economics, landscape 
architecture and information technology.  
 
Victorian local governments have been leaders in the reform process, undergoing 
considerable change and restructuring since the early 1990s. In keeping with the 
highly prescriptive approach taken by the state government, local governments 
were required to introduce commercial approaches to their operations, reform 
their organisational and management structures on the basis of NPM principles, 
and introduce compulsory competitive tendering. The Victorian State Government 
undertook to radically change all local governments by dismissing elected 
councillors, adjusting territorial boundaries and amalgamating most councils, 
appointing commissioners to manage council operations on private sector 
principles and strengthening the position of council CEOs.  The outcome of these 
reforms was to ‘marketise and managerialise relationships within the 
organisation’ (Van Gramberg & Teicher, 2000, p. 489).  Following the re-
instatement of elected councillors, changes to the Victorian Public Sector Reform 
Act 1997 also conferred greater personnel and managerial authority on the chief 
executive officers. Contract rather than tenure became the core principle of public 
employment at local government level and performance agreements were 
established as a necessary condition in the appointment of CEOs and senior 
managers.  
 
The Queensland State Government did not undertake such a comprehensive 
approach to reform.  Historically Queensland state governments have treated local 
government with a degree of ambivalence by providing them with general 
competence powers for the good rule and government of their communities 
(Tucker, 1981).  The introduction of NPM elements began in the early 1990s as 
part of a process to modernise the conservative nature of the Queensland public 
sector and local government. The objective of the reforms was to encourage local 
government to be more responsive to political direction and more in tune with 
contemporary thinking regarding public sector management (Bradley and Parker, 
2006, p. 92). The provisions of the Queensland Local Government Act 1993 made 
corporate planning mandatory and the transfer of the executive function from the 
mayor to appointed officials. These changes were seen to be ‘sweeping 
Queensland local government towards increasingly bureaucratised arrangements’ 
(Tucker, 1994). In 2007, in a relatively uncharacteristic move, the Queensland 
government ignored the evidence from other jurisdictions questioning the benefits 
of boundary changes and forced the amalgamation of local councils throughout 
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 the state, reducing the total number of councils from 157 to 73. The dramatic 
intrusion was justified on the grounds that councils had been too slow in 
addressing management issues such as the long-term sustainability of local 
councils, the need to adopt more strategic planning and avoid ‘internally focused 
parochial mindset[s]; and to reduce the inconsistency of performance and service 
delivery across the local government sector’ (DLGPS&R, 2007, p. 11).  The 
amalgamations combined with the reforms of the 1990s have jointly contributed 
to management and leadership challenges and increased the salience of the skills 
of CEOs in the Queensland local government system. 
 
Both the Victorian and Queensland governments codified the CEO position in 
local government legislation.  In Victoria the role of the Chief Executive Officer 
as defined in Section 94A of the Local Government Act (1989) is to: 
 
• Establish and maintain an appropriate organisational structure for the 
Council; 
• Ensure that the decisions of the Council are implemented without undue 
delay; 
• Manage Council’s day-to-day operations in accordance with the council 
plan; 
• Develop, adopt and disseminate a code of conduct for Council staff; and 
• Provide timely advice to the Council. 
 
In addition, the CEO has responsibility for the appointment and dismissal of all 
council staff.  In an attempt to re-enforce the policy/administration dichotomy, the 
Victorian Act clearly restricts councillors from interfering in the roles and 
responsibilities of council staff and the day to day activities of the administration.  
Councillors are only responsible for the appointment of the CEO, in this regard 
they negotiate contractual obligations and manage and review CEO performance.  
According to the Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) the Act specifies a 
clear distinction between policy and implementation:  
 
Management accountability is a fundamental responsibility of the elected 
council.  When council has decided on its direction, strategy and 
policies, it delegates authority to the CEO for implementing these 
decisions and managing day-to-day operations (MAV, 2010). 
 
The Queensland Government introduced a new Local Government Act (2009) 
which takes a less prescriptive approach than its predecessor.  Under the new Act 
councils are given discretion in determining appropriate policies for their 
communities, including the method of choosing a CEO.  According to Part 5, 
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 Division 1 of the Act a person is qualified to be the Chief Executive Officer if 
they have the ability, experience, knowledge and skills that the local councillors 
consider appropriate.  The CEO must be appointed under a contract and meet the 
performance standards set by the individual council.  The remainder of the Act is 
reasonably brief on the duties of the CEO and does not make a clear distinction 
between politics and administration: 
 
• The chief executive officer must appoint the local government employees 
(§196, 2). 
• The chief executive officer must consult with the councillors before 
appointing a senior contract employee (§196, 4). 
• The chief executive officer is the only person who may take disciplinary 
action against a local government employee (§197, 1). 
 
Under the Queensland legislation the way is left open for councillors, the Mayor 
particularly, to be more involved in the day-to-day management of the council and 
the work of the CEO.  This involvement reflects the Mayor as executive officer 
tradition characteristic of the Queensland system (Tucker, 1981, p. 394). It also 
reflects the historic differences between the two state systems where the Victorian 
Government has been more likely to adopt a much more interventionist and 
prescriptive approach compared to Queensland in its dealings with local 
government (Bowman, 1981). This contrast has contributed to the different 
approaches to the roles and responsibilities of the CEOs in each system.  
 
Both state governments provide little beyond the legislative requirements in the 
way of the specific elements of contractual arrangements.  Victorian councils have 
tended to adhere to the five key areas of responsibility for CEOs prescribed in the 
Act as the basis for performance indicators.  Local government associations 
provide some advice for councils in drafting CEO contracts and performance 
criteria.  For example, the MAV offers broad advice: 
 
In order to assess the performance of the CEO, the elected council 
determines systems for monitoring performance. This can be managed 
by specifying performance goals, key performance indicators and 
evaluation methods in the CEO’s contract of employment. The CEO’s 
performance is reviewed regularly and contracts of employment are 
signed for three or five year durations (MAV, 2010). 
 
However, in both contexts councils are largely free, outside the legislative 
conditions, to prescribe their own conditions and individual requirements placed 
upon their CEOs.  In both cases individual CEOs are left to negotiate their own 
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 employment conditions including the terms of their contracts and the performance 
criteria by which the council will assess them on a regular basis.  
 
Impacts of the Reforms 
 
The introduction of managerialist requirements of competitive tendering, 
contracting out and competitive neutrality measures into Victorian and 
Queensland local governments brought a ‘dramatic change’ to the way CEOs 
went about their business (Worthington et al., 2002).  The requirements 
introduced in Victoria were the most comprehensive, with all councils required to 
meet compulsory, competitively neutral pricing principles for tenders by 1997. In 
Queensland only large local urban governments were required to introduce 
competitive policy for major business.  Assessments of the results of the 
introduction of the competitive reforms found success was largely derived from 
the introduction of improvements in the management practices and cultural 
change of local councils (Industry Commission, 1996). Management initiatives 
that established changes to work practices, the development of staff skills, the 
efficient use of capital and the identification of innovative and flexible service 
delivery methodologies were key factors contributing to CEOs succeeding in 
achieving savings from the competitive measures.   
 
Evidence of the achievements of the reform process has been mixed and suggests 
they have not achieved their intended results. Despite the measures imposed by 
the Victorian government, the operation and culture of local governments remains 
little changed since the early 1990s. Surveys conducted in the first decade found 
little evidence to support changes to management practices in keeping with the 
intention of the reforms (Kloot and Martin, 2002, p. 16).  More recent research 
shows the outcomes in terms of internal culture and leadership style are little 
changed from those prior to the introduction of the reforms: ‘CEOs in local 
government are still, by and large, from a public sector background.  There has 
not been a successful injection of private sector expertise at that level’ (Dempsey, 
2006, p. 257).  The familiar clan-based culture is still overwhelmingly dominant, 
despite the reforms which were designed to overlay a market-oriented culture on 
the sector’ (Kloot and Martin, 2007, p. 495). Resistance to the purchaser provider 
basis for service delivery by both management and staff in Victorian local 
governments has tended to favour bids by in-house teams over external 
contractors (O’Flynn and Alford, 2008).  A recent Auditor-General’s report found 
performance management capabilities in local government to be weak:  ‘In most 
cases councillors and council staff are not equipped with the knowledge and skills 
required to fully understand and develop appropriate performance reports’ (VAG, 
2008, p. 2).  Not surprisingly, in the highly prescriptive and legalistic relationship 
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 with the state government, Victorian local governments have seen minimum legal 
requirements as the maximum standard to be achieved.  
 
Reports on the management policies and practices of Queensland local councils 
suggest many are not fully committed to corporate planning and NPM practices.  
Surveys have found only 15 of the 73 councils throughout the state could be 
regarded as having good governance practices in place2. Four in five councils 
failed to implement asset management plans, only 56 per cent of councils’ 
corporate plans included long-term financial projections, and there has been 
limited integration between community consultation and policy development 
across all councils (DIP, 2009).  In 2010 the Queensland Auditor-General 
reported that many councils had poor financial management practices, several 
councils had failed to reasonably separate the policy and administration functions, 
with councillors maintaining the discretion to allocate funding to specific projects 
or grants to community groups.  Such poor governance practices, according to the 
Auditor-General, continued to produce potential for conflicts of interest and 
threatened the financial sustainability of these councils (QAO, 2009: QAO, 2010). 
Where councils had effective approaches to governance and financial 
management they tended to be large and located in metropolitan areas with highly 
qualified and experienced staff, effective management practices and clearer 
boundaries between policy and administration.   
 
Despite these weaknesses at the organisational level there has been some evidence 
from both states to show that performance contracts are taken seriously by senior 
council staff and that there is commitment to establishing professional approaches 
to the work undertaken (Haidar and Spooner, 2009; QAO, 2010; DIP, 2009). 
CEOs in both systems recognise the uniqueness of their positions and tend not to 
compare themselves and their roles more with private or public sector managers. 
CEOs interviewed for this research focused more strongly on outcomes rather 
than on the management of processes; their roles are now firmly in the ‘political 
bureaucrat’ than ‘classical bureaucrat’ category (Putnam, 1975). This research 
extends Gerritsen’s (1998) earlier findings that reforms introduced by the state 
governments have clearly changed the focus of the CEO to approaches with 
greater emphasis on leadership and entrepreneurial activities.  
 
The general conclusion from Australian and international experience is that 
embedding reform into an organisational culture is clearly challenging for all 
parties and requires more than regulation and legislation.  The ‘one-size fits all’ 
                                                 
2
 Good governance is seen by the Queensland Auditor-General to depend on transparency, 
accountability and equality in ways that are responsive to the present and future needs of the local 
government community (QOA, 2010, p. 27).  
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 reform framework fails to recognise many of the difficulties of improving 
performance in the public sector. There are questions over whether local 
government performance as a whole can be improved by a central government 
reform process (Jones 2004; Kuhlmann, 2010). Victoria and Queensland have 
taken different paths to the way reforms of their local government sectors have 
been implemented.  In both instances, however, there has been an increase in the 
importance of the role of the CEO to the effectiveness and sustainability of local 
councils.  The performance of individual local councils rests very much on the 
capacities and performance of the CEO (Pullin and Haidar, 2003). The 
management of the tension between declining resources and increasing 
community demands has created substantial management pressures for local 
government CEOs. CEOs interviewed for this research confirmed that the 
establishment of employment conditions through effective contracts and 
performance management criteria can be fundamental to their relationship with 
the councillors and, as a result, to their success in the role and the overall 
performance of the organisation.   
 
 
Conceptualising the CEO Experience 
 
Reforms introduced into local government systems have resulted in increased and 
conflicting demands on those responsible for managing, organising and delivering 
local government services (Ahmad and Broussine, 2007). Increased areas of local 
government responsibility, a more competitive environment, a more demanding 
community, and restricted financial resources combined with contractual 
performance requirements in the often volatile world of local politics merge to 
produce a unique, complex and challenging environment for management and 
leadership.   
 
Understanding the uniqueness of the CEO experience in local government will 
help to identify key capacities relevant to successfully undertaking the role.  For 
guidance in considering the significance of the challenges in the role of local 
government CEOs, we can use the seminal work of Mintzberg’s (1998) three 
‘edge’ model for public sector leaders as a frame of reference.  In this model the 
CEO needs to provide leadership at the ‘operating edge’, where they connect with 
their managers and staff to bring about action from within the organisation.  The 
CEO also needs to connect with the ‘stakeholder edge’; namely all the outside 
players that bring tangible pressures to bear especially on them.  Finally, CEOs 
need to connect with the ‘political edge’; the politicians that are linked with the 
organisation and its operation.  Each edge has considerable demands in its own 
right.  Having the skills and experiences to manage and provide effective 
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 leadership at each of the edges simultaneously requires a rare ability; in fact 
Mintzberg (1998) argues it is virtually impossible.   
 
We can use the work of Broussine (2000) to support Mintzberg’s (1998) analysis 
in terms of the CEO’s personal capacities to manage the issues at each of the 
edges.  Broussine (2000) has argued that it is the ‘capacity’ of CEOs rather than 
their competence that determines their ability to manage the interconnected, 
dynamic and paradoxical elements to their work.  An examination of the role of 
the CEO in the context of the three edges will identify a particular set of 
circumstances and characteristics that assist in understanding the demands of the 
position and the important aspects of contractual and performance measures.   
 
Information presented is derived from confidential semi-structured personal 
interviews with chief executives from large metropolitan local governments in 
Victoria and Queensland and non-government organisations in each state with 
special interest in municipal issues. A series of interview questions was 
developed, largely based on the current local government leadership literature, to 
guide each interview session but interviewees were given opportunities to expand 
on their own interpretations and analysis of the CEO role. These independent 
views provided an insight into the idiosyncrasies and complexities of the role of 
the CEO in each situation and contributed to refinements to the conceptual 




The Operating Edge 
 
According to Jones (1989, p. 81) the new public management and managerialist 
requirements of competitive tendering, contracting out and competitive neutrality 
measures have increased the skills required of the CEO in terms of managing the 
operations and long-term directions of local councils.  The reforms affecting local 
government were intended to result in providing a more business-like framework 
to the local government management context.  The intention of the reforms was 
for CEOs to take a strategic view of the council and its future, and not become 
involved in day-to-day routine. They were urged to manage by exception, to be 
skilled delegators, be interested in coordination, and would often spend time 
negotiating with other local councils, central government departments and private 
corporations with an influence in the area (Jones, 1989, p. 81).  
 
A key aspect of the CEO role is the horizontal management of initiatives across 
the organisation. Siegel (2010, pp. 145-47) points to local governments’ 
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 challenges in dealing with ‘wicked problems’ that do not sit within specific local 
government functions.  This expansion of activities has presented considerable 
management challenges, as CEOs are required to provide leadership across the 
spectrum of activities.  For example, CEOs of large urban councils are required to 
deliver on council commitments for improved transport, quality urban 
environments, community services, council facilities, economic development, 
open governance and environmental leadership (SCC, 2006).  CEOs interviewed 
for this research argued that it was critical to work with their elected members to 
identify clear and achievable outcomes in these areas when establishing key 
performance indicators for both themselves and their senior managers.  Most 
important for these CEOs was the need to clarify the boundaries of politics and 
administration.  The greatest disparities between councils were in Queensland, 
where small rural and remote councils exhibited the greatest levels of interference 
by councillors in the day-to-day running of the council.  This is exacerbated by 
the fact that Queensland councillors are paid a full-time salary and tend to treat 
their roles as a job.  In some instances CEOs needed to educate councillors and 
develop guidelines on their legal obligations in their dealings with professional 
staff.   
 
Other factors such as managerial resistance, financial constraints, inexperience of 
existing council managers, and tensions between managerialism and the 
governance functions of local government have all contributed to the difficulties 
experienced by Victorian CEOs along Mintzberg’s (1998) ‘operating edge’ (Van 
Gramberg et al., 2000).  To be successful in this organisational context, CEOs 
need the capacity to ‘lead, change and develop the organisation’ (Broussine, 2000, 
p. 503). CEOs interviewed for this research argued there are a number of 
dimensions at play here as they manage the critical aspects of their role.  In order 
to be effective these CEOs argued they need to maintain consistency in their 
approach which includes being a champion of the values of the organisation, yet 
being adaptable to changed circumstances, and developing open and community-
oriented approaches. CEOs need to ensure a balance between the achievement of 
measurable and reportable objectives and the pursuit of strategic long-term 
visionary objectives.  In this regard CEOs in both Victoria and Queensland need 
to establish trust-based relationships with their councils that give them confidence 
the long-term interests of the community are being served by the actions of the 
organisation. 
 
These dimensions are central elements of a transformational leadership style (for 
example raises followers’ consciousness about idealised goals and encourages 
followers to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of larger goals) that suits 
a value-based context perceived as necessary to harness the commitment and 
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 motivation of staff with public sector motivations (Paarlberg and Lavigna, 2010).  
CEOs interviewed in this study confirmed the difficulties of maintaining these 
strategic elements of their role in the context of continual change.  Election cycles 
contributed to this difficulty, with decisions by each state to change the frequency 
of elections from every 3 to every 4 years.  Of particular concern in the Victorian 
context was the restriction of strategic planning due to the changing prescriptions 
of the state government. Queensland local governments, with their general 
competence powers should provide an environment where the CEO can exercise 
their capacity in this area.  However, a number of Queensland CEOs argued the 
constant changes brought about through changes to state government legislation 
placed considerable controls and impositions on their performance in the role.  
 
CEOs argued that they needed to work with uncertainty, ambiguity, and the 
inevitability of change.  Broussine (2000, p. 503) has discussed the need to 
develop ‘appropriate’ power relationships between manager and staff which entail 
taking a team-based approach including both delegating where required and 
empowering staff to bring forward new ideas and innovations.  In managing this 
‘edge’ effectively CEOs also need the capacity to maintain focus on strategic and 
long-term issues.  This dimension requires CEOs to effectively set and 
communicate the vision, develop the relevant organisational culture and keep the 
focus on the broad picture while also being cognisant of the limitations and 
potential of the organisation to achieve the vision.  The strategies employed by 
CEOs in both Queensland and Victoria to bring about success in this dimension 
were based on a combination of previous experience and their individual 
capacities.  Each interviewee indicated that they had a strong commitment to the 
value of their own ability to undertake this element of their role.  They agreed that 
the terms and conditions under which they were prepared to be assessed needed to 
be established early in their employment negotiations.  Performance indicators 
with which they believed their role could be measured sat comfortably with the 
outcomes-focus of managerialism introduced by the reform process.  Performance 
measures were largely related to quantitative aspects along this ‘edge’ such as 
capital expenditure, service improvements and customer satisfaction levels.  The 
more substantial difficulties of performance measurement related to the other 
dimensions of their roles along the political and stakeholder edges.  
 
 
The Political Edge 
 
CEOs interviewed for this research saw their effectiveness being directly related 
to the relationship they had with the elected representatives.  Unlike their state and 
federal public sector counterparts, CEOs are not responsible to a single political 
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 authority, such as a Minister.  CEOs really have a unique situation in that they are 
responsible to each of their elected representatives.  While the relationship 
between the Mayor and the CEO is critical, CEOs need to report and respond to 
all councillors.  Siegel (2010, p. 152) regarded this as the most difficult task for 
the local government CEO.  Being able to manage the political edge requires the 
strongest leadership skills of a CEO as they are often required to ‘lead up’: 
‘Leading up involves the very subtle ability to work with a diverse and sometimes 
divided group of councillors to further the interests of the municipality and its 
residents’ (Seigel, 2010, p. 155).  Surveys of Victorian CEOs have demonstrated 
that they rely on their personal value systems and sound judgments to deal with 
the political dimension of their work.  The political dimension often raised ethical 
dilemmas and concerns, in particular clashes between the council administration 
and elected representatives (Dempsey, 2006; p. 278).  
 
Other research findings have emphasised the difficulties of working along the 
political edge.  A survey by Broussine, (2000, p. 506) identified the political 
dimension as the most ‘challenging and problematic’ aspect of successfully 
undertaking the CEO role, concluding that failure to recognise the need for 
balance between what is rational and what is political will contribute to an 
inability to work in this dimension.  Self’s (1972) ‘junction’ of the political and 
administrative is an idea familiar to the CEOs interviewed for this research.  
Being able to realise the ideas of local councillors was still identified as a key skill 
of the successful CEO.  There is no guiding central policy or mandate for local 
councils, so CEOs can be called upon to mediate in disputes over policy 
directions. Influencing directions, dealing with changing councillor expectations, 
spotting political trouble and being able to work well with the Mayor were all 
critical to success in the role.  CEOs that had established ground rules about their 
relationships with the Mayor and councillors very early in their contracts argued 
this was a critical element to successfully undertaking their roles.  A lack of 
clarity surrounding the council’s expectations about CEO roles and in particular 
concerning the boundaries between their respective roles only contributed to 
difficulties over time.   
 
Other surveys have suggested that elected councillors have a significant impact on 
the career development and experience of Council CEOs. Interviewees discussed 
the often short-term nature of the role and the need to recognise their use-by date 
as political focus changes or new opportunities emerge elsewhere. Some suggest 
the onus is on the CEO to adapt to the managerial style of the Mayor. The ability 
to be flexible and change is what ultimately determines long-term success for 
individual CEOs (Martin and Simons, 2002; p. 74).  Broussine (2010) discussed 
the need for CEOs to be ‘streetwise’ in terms of their ability to predict trouble and 
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 manoeuvre through political ‘bear-traps’. Diamond (2007, ii) argued that for 
Victorian CEOs performance is not the major determinant of success; rather the 
capacity to engage councillors was identified as the most crucial issue in gaining 
successful outcomes. Queensland CEOs have also emphasised the importance of 
this balancing act. For example, one CEO claimed the success of working the 
politics/administration junction became a career highlight: ‘I think creating a level 
of stability within the organisation was probably one of my greatest 
achievements’ (Moore, 2010). Such activities can be time consuming, distracting 
and exhausting when, arguably, focus ought to be on broader issues and strategic 
directions.  If the CEO is unable to establish stability early in their contract period 
it can be disruptive to council operations and the community.  
 
Local government CEOs in Queensland and Victoria can be seen to comply with 
the responsive administrator model developed by Golden (2000). In this model, 
elected officials have final authority over major policy decisions models, they set 
the course and shape the terms of the relationship with administrators.  Elected 
officials may be activists committed to a political agenda or may be authorised by 
the formal structure to fill a dominant leadership role over administrators. The 
model recognises a questioning and resistant approach by CEOs, even if there is 
eventually responsiveness to political goals. Loyalty can be based on either 
questioning compliance to directions, which is more characteristic of the separate 
roles model, or acceptance of political goals, which reflects the responsive 
administrator model.  This model is based on the presumption that politicians are 
looking for politically responsive competence from administrators and that CEOs 
find it to be in their interests to provide it (Svara, 2006, p. 960).  
 
Being effective along the political edge can mark the difference between success 
and failure for a CEO.  Perhaps the most challenging aspect is to incorporate 
performance indicators into a contract.  Most CEOs argued that this is impossible 
and therefore irrelevant to the contractual arrangements.  The subjectivity of 
‘getting on with the Mayor’ was perceived as a key element, yet is difficult if not 
impossible to measure.  Shifting with the political tide also raises the possibility 
of the CEO looking weak to senior managers and staff who may find constant 
change in policy emphasis disruptive and de-motivating.  This is where the CEO 
needs to draw on their capacity to mix their own ideas with particular political 
circumstance and to balance what is rational with what is political (Broussine, 
2000, p. 502). The CEO must be policy-oriented but not political (Siegal, 2010, p. 
157). Without this balance there can be serious consequences. Several empirical 
studies have suggested that political disputes can be a significant cause of CEO 
turnover contributing to resignation prior to contract completions (see, for 
example, McCabe, Feiock, Clingermayer, 2003; Boyne, James, John, & 
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 Petrovsky, 2010).  Changes in these key areas are unsettling to the organisation 
and impact on policy outcomes. 
 
The Stakeholder Edge 
 
As a result of the local government reforms CEOs in Victoria and Queensland are 
directly involved in a broad range of issues under each area of council activity.  
Taking a lead role in complex multi-stakeholder negotiations entails that the CEO 
needs skills to resolve matters in a way that is simultaneously administratively and 
politically feasible.  CEOs now deal with a wide range of stakeholders, including 
representatives from the local community, government agencies from both 
national and state governments, other councils in their region, the media, clients 
and contractors.  NPM reforms in both Queensland and Victoria have resulted in 
CEOs being required to broaden their outlook in terms of service delivery 
alongside looking for entrepreneurial opportunities. Most of the CEOs 
interviewed for this research argued that they now spend more time dealing with 
stakeholders and clients than they do with the Mayor and councillors.   
 
Victorian local governments have been required to consult with their communities 
since the late 1990s.  Under Section 7 of the Local Government Act 1989 a local 
government is required to ‘develop a program of regular consultation with its 
community in relation to the services it provides’.  Councils develop community 
plans that reflect the state government’s requirements to consult with relevant 
groups.  Demands for community consultation require considerable demands on 
organisational and management skills of the CEO and senior managers.  Policies 
established need to strike a balance between the seemingly conflicting demands 
for administrative efficiency and open, accountable, democratic decision-making 
processes. One example is the Darebin City Council’s Community Consultation 
Policy, which established commitments including providing opportunities for 
direct community involvement in decision-making, ensured governance processes 
are equitable and provided effective access to all members of the community (City 
of Darebin, 2002, p. 9).  The ability to undertake such commitments emphasises 
the management skills of the CEO and their importance to both the council and 
the community. As an example Victoria’s Portland Shire Council recognises the 
importance of the connectedness of the CEO to community development. Without 
a CEO who can build strong relationships with key stakeholders, the council 
argues ‘nothing much gets done in Portland’ (Meldrum, 2010).  Surveys reveal 
that the majority of Victorian senior local government officers actively persuade 
local councillors to adopt policy decisions that are in the interest of the broader 
community (Haidar et al., 2009, p. 92).  
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In 2007 the Queensland government introduced measures encouraging councils to 
establish governance and community engagement policies.  Such measures have 
increased the need for councils to undertake community consultation processes 
and integrate them with all other aspects of council planning.  Initial research has 
found that early responses to community engagement have been mixed.  While 
98% of Queensland local councils have some form of community engagement 
activity there is some difficulty in transferring this engagement into governance 
practices.  The key management issue of integrating community engagement into 
the planning processes of councils has only been undertaken by one third of 
councils (DIP, 2009).  
 
Broussine, (2003) has observed several trends as a result of the introduction of 
many NPM reforms. Local government CEOs are now required to represent the 
interest of the community as a whole in decision-making in a multi-stakeholder 
environment and alongside ensuring that the council operates within the law. 
Resisting political pressure from those responsible for framing CEOs’ 
employment contracts can place considerable pressure on neutrality and public 
service integrity. CEOs are thus inevitably drawn in to the policy process through 
their negotiations with representatives from local associations, surrounding local 
councils, and the general community.  CEOs also have to be able to initiate 
concerted action, not only within their own organisations but among a set of 
stakeholders with different and competing interests.  Since the emergence of 
regional approaches to local government issues (see, for example, Marshall, 
Dollery and Witherby, 2003) other councils have also formed part of the 
‘stakeholder edge’. The re-emphasis on Regional Organisations of Councils 
(ROCs) in the 1990s has witnessed the importance of regional cooperation in 
terms of government funding and development planning.  Managing this range of 
sometimes competing interests is a challenging aspect of the CEO’s 
responsibilities.  CEOs described the need for personal qualities of courage, 
passion and resilience in many situations they face along the stakeholder edge.  
 
The local government reforms in both Queensland and Victoria have seen CEOs 
increasingly drawn in to the political process resulting in a certain degree of 
ambiguity in the role. This requires strong leadership skills to manage 
appropriately.  With no clear political mandate at the local level, elected 
representatives are free to pursue their own agenda.  Policy skills are generally 
weak for part-time councillors in Victoria and for councillors in regional and 
remote areas in the Queensland system.  CEOs need to take a strong leadership 
role with these councillors by educating and developing guidelines for appropriate 
actions in terms of strategy and policy development.  It is in such circumstances 
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 that Siegel (2010) sees the need for CEOs to have the skills of ‘managing up’. The 
reality of councillors representing the community as a whole can become 
questionable, particularly in division-based or multi-ward systems, where 
candidates are elected by a specific geographic area rather than by the broader 
council jurisdiction.  Particular interests can benefit from fielding their own 
candidates and placing pressure on others to support specific proposals.  In such 
circumstances, CEOs can become the voice of the community in the policy 
process as they are exposed to broader issues through managing along the 
stakeholder dimension.  
 
Managing relationships with state and federal agencies has become a significant 
element of the CEO’s role.  National governments have become increasingly 
involved in local government issues as they see local councils as effective partners 
in the delivery of programmes and services. Councils need to negotiate with these 
agencies and help ensure these programmes reflect the needs of their 
communities. The capacity to work with other agencies as an important corollary 
of 'joined up government', and one that contributes to achieving local government 
objectives.  For Broussine (2003) the chief executive occupies a role at the 
boundary of the internal and external worlds of the organisation.  CEOs argue the 
requirements of government agencies often place time consuming and conflicting 
demands upon them as they need to adjust council processes to the amendments to 
legislation and ensure national and state policy objectives fit with community 
needs and expectations. One example has been the amendments to planning 
legislation in Queensland in 2009. Queensland CEOs argue these amendments 
have been poorly managed by state government agencies as they have been 
imposed without consultation, without consideration of the implications for 
council resources, and without crucial consideration of the views of local 
communities.  
 
Siegel (2010) observed that when working along the ‘stakeholder edge’ the CEO 
can become both broker and a diplomat. In some cases the CEO needs to take the 
lead role in pursuing opportunities for the local area simply because they have the 
required skills and knowledge. Opportunities for joint ventures that require 
considerable investment and contractual obligations by the council can see the 
CEO in delicate negotiations where they make significant decisions of a complex 
nature.  Yet the CEO also needs to be aware of not going too far outside the policy 
objectives of the council and the needs of the community. Without these 
capacities in their CEO, local governments can miss opportunities for 
improvements and development within their community.  But there is a need for 
balance as councils consider the extent of freedom they delegate to their CEO in 
pursuing such opportunities along the stakeholder edge.  CEOs also need to 
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 balance their legal and political obligations with the demands for more 
entrepreneurial approaches to the projects they undertake. 
 
 
CEO Contracts and Performance 
 
The contractual and performance arrangements established by the elected 
councillors can considerably impact on a CEO’s ability to successfully undertake 
their role. Despite the legislative attempts through the reform process to separate 
the political and administrative functions, there continues to be considerable scope 
for political interference. CEOs interviewed for this research argued their 
contracts played a minor role in determining their day-to-day performance. But 
they did agree that the initial negotiations over their contracts required high-level 
negotiation skills on their behalf to establish the conditions under which they were 
prepared to work. Their performance indicators served as the basis for the 
performance of senior managers and the organisation as a whole.  There have 
been continuing calls for contractual arrangements for CEOs to be more specific 
in terms of clarifying roles and providing clear guidance for performance 
measures (Jones, 2004: Gerritsen et al., 1998).  Councillors, particularly those in 
smaller, non-metropolitan councils, tend to lack expertise in developing precise 
performance criteria when drafting CEO contracts.  Adding to the difficulties are 
the results of recent reports which show that the employment relationships in 
many local councils continue to be politicised (Haidar et al., 2009).  These factors 
can be critical in the local government context under new contractual employment 
arrangements with poor job security and lack of tenure.   
 
Despite these limitations CEOs have been shown to be highly professional and 
committed to fair and equitable performance evaluation processes, however in 
circumstances of unclear and unwritten performance measures there is a tendency 
to adopt a ‘more mobile attitude to their employment’ (Pullin & Haidar, 2003). 
Such circumstances, if coupled with poor performance appraisal systems, have 
been shown to affect the psychological contract between the employer and 
employee and contribute to a lack of engagement with the work, a reduced level 
of motivation in developing new ideas and innovation, reduced job satisfaction 
and organisational commitment (Ghorpade, Chen and Caggiano 1995; Blau, 1999: 
Kavanah, Benson and Brown, 2007).   
Experience in Queensland has shown costly disputes, organisational instability 
and poor performance can emerge between a council and its CEO resulting from 
poorly articulated and disputed performance criteria (Maeseele, 2010; Chambers, 
2009).  Some research has suggested that turnover of CEOs has flow-on effects 
contributing to senior management turnover following a chief executive 
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 succession (Boyne, James, John, and Petrovsky, 2010).  Concurrently, other 
evidence suggests that local councils which perform well have lower numbers of 
CEO successions (Boyne, John and Petrovsky, 2008: Ashworth, Boyne, and 
Entwistle, 2010). The uniqueness of the local government context renders inherent 
difficulties in establishing measurable organisational and individual performance 
goals and targets which can accommodate the need for flexibility and balance 
when dealing with the dynamism of political and community demands.  The 
paradox is one of the requirements for accuracy in reflecting the nature of the 
CEO’s role alongside the demand of fairness in applying the specifics of 
performance measures.  The application of Mintzberg’s (1998) framework has 
provided an insight into the demands of the CEO role in the local government 
context and the requirement that CEOs must operate along the three edges at the 
same time.   
 
It is largely because of this uniqueness that the majority of CEOs are reluctant to 
subscribe to the value of any particular management theory.  ‘The experience of 
being a leader in local government is more complex and contradictory than 
conventional management textbooks would allow’ (Dempsey, 2006, p. 278).  
Such findings are in keeping with Broussine’s (2000) argument that CEOs are 
defined by their capacity rather than by a specific list of competencies that 
emphasise a legislatively mandated approach to the management context.  The 
key competencies required of a CEO are the ability to hold complexity, ambiguity 
and paradox in order to be effective (Broussine, 2000, p. 501). These were the 
findings of Dempsey (2006) in her examination of CEOs in Victoria and were 
reinforced in the findings of this research examining both Victorian and 
Queensland local government CEOs.  CEOs discussed the need for courage, 
resilience and strength of character as being critical capacities to achieving their 
objectives. The challenge for councils is to recognise this uniqueness in their 
recruitment and selection of candidates for the CEO position. Bozionelas (2005) 
found that sometimes the best person for the job was not selected; rather, panel 
members chose the person most like themselves; the one they felt comfortable 
with, with a view to building relationships with the new person, thereby 
strengthening their own power base (Dempsey & Diamond, 2006). Such practices 
contribute to slow rates of change to local government performance. Local 
government managers associations in both Victoria and Queensland have been 
working towards redressing this by offering advisory services, model contracts 
and performance indicators for councils seeking to appoint a new CEO. 
Queensland councils tend to work on their own throughout the appointment 
process preferring to negotiate contracts and performance measures directly with 
the chosen candidate. For small councils, this process contributes to poor 
performance figures identified in the Ombudsman and Auditor-General’s reports. 
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 Victorian CEOs also prefer the presence of third parties, primarily legal advisers 
or HR consultants, throughout the performance assessment process to ensure 
councils do not make unprecedented or unconfirmed demands. In this context 
councils are reluctant to pursue strategies outside those prescribed in legislation. 
Many CEOs are constrained by the conservatism of this approach and are 






The reforms introduced by the Queensland and Victorian governments since the 
1980s have increased the range and complexity of responsibilities of local 
governments. These reforms have contributed to the uniqueness of the 
management and leadership role of local council CEOs. The need to manage and 
lead simultaneously along the three ‘edges’ identified by Mintzberg (1998) entails 
that the local government CEO faces considerable challenges generally not 
required by other CEOs in the public or private sectors.   
 
The Victorian reforms have not produced consistency in local council 
performance despite the highly prescriptive nature of the local government 
legislation. There is still sufficient room for individual discretion by councils to 
restrict improvements to management practices either through political 
interference or an inability to take a strategic focus.  Prescription promotes a 
highly legalistic approach to CEO contractual arrangements which can contribute 
to a reduced focus on the full potential of the CEO’s role and responsibilities.  The 
prescriptive basis to the Victorian system entails CEOs often have difficulty 
getting councils to consider initiatives beyond the requirements of the legislation 
or beyond a limited number of quantitative measurable performance indicators.   
 
Queensland CEOs argued they had greater potential to achieve an entrepreneurial 
focus than their Victorian counterparts. The Queensland Local Government Act 
(2009) general competence approach provides less prescription and allows greater 
potential for CEOs and councils to negotiate broader qualitative performance 
indicators.  In most cases the opportunity to pursue higher level strategic goals can 
be determined by the willingness of the Mayor and the council and the negotiating 
skills and capacities of the CEO. For example, one CEO discussed his initiative to 
pursue an opportunity to guide a major redevelopment of the CBD through 
initiating joint venture agreements.  By setting the boundaries early in the 
contractual arrangements supported by appropriate and relevant performance 
indicators, Queensland CEOs argued they can lead organisational change, 
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 improve performance and sustainability and move councils beyond what one CEO 
called ‘pothole politics’.   
 
In both states effective managers and CEOs that are given management discretion 
with little political interference from councillors guided the better performing 
councils. Poor performing councils are politically fractious where CEOs tend to 
maintain the traditional town clerk approach to management with the Mayor 
maintaining strong executive control.   
 
Research suggests that CEOs can be a significant catalyst for change within the 
local government system. Successful CEOs share several common characteristics 
which reflect the ability to effectively manage their councils along the three 
edges. These CEOs tend to possess transformational, charismatic and almost 
superhuman qualities.  Their ability to manage along the political edge by 
separating themselves from electoral politics while remaining politically sensitive 
is the most common factor contributing to their ability to successfully do their job. 
A key challenge for councils is to establish contractual and performance 
management systems that allow these superheroes to achieve their objectives, to 
deal more effectively with challenges facing our communities and contribute to 
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